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The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003: A False Hope
Jay Reyero*
If Legislation was created to protect "an extremely important and popu-
lar means of communication"' from the threatening "rapid growth in the vol-
ume of unsolicited commercial electronic mail,"2 one would think that the
threat would be controlled within a short time of the legislation being imple-
mented. Congress created the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Por-
nography and Marketing Act of 2003 ("CAN-SPAM Act") to aid consumers
in the fight against unsolicited commercial electronic mail. But despite go-
ing into effect on January 1, 2004, we are no closer to eliminating or control-
ling spam now than we were three years ago.3 Why does this inability to
control spain still exist even with the creation of Congressional legislation?
While the CAN-SPAM Act was initially designed to fight spam, it actually
does very little in the fight against spare. Instead of protecting consumers, it
protects commercial marketers; instead of focusing on "unsolicited" email, it
focuses on "deceptive" email; instead of tackling the problem, it shifts the
burden to others; instead of creating a strong legal foundation when preemp-
tion occurs, it creates a weak national standard that usurps stronger state
initiatives.
Considering that even after the enactment of the CAN-SPAM Act there
is a continued inundation of unsolicited emails into our mailboxes, this com-
ment argues that the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 was a false hope-the enact-
ment of the Act presented an apparent promise to consumers to prevent the
continued invasion by unsolicited emails, but the Act's intentions and effect
were never meant to meet consumers' expectations. This comment begins in
Part I laying a foundation defining the exact nature of spam by detailing the
birth of spam, describing how it works, and highlighting the problems associ-
ated with it. Part II focuses on Congress's response to the spam problem by
describing the policy determinations supporting the CAN-SPAM Act of
2003, and briefly discussing the sections contained within the Act. Part III's
focus is on the particularly important preemption Section 7707. Included is a
brief look into preemption precedents, followed by an analysis of the statu-
tory text of the section, and lastly, an examination of two cases that focused
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1. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act
[hereinafter CAN-SPAM Act], 15 U.S.C.S. § 7701(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2007).
2. Id. § 7701(a)(2).
3. In 2006, spain accounted for nearly nine out of ten emails as average spain
levels reached 86.2%. MessageLabs, 2006: The Year Spam Raised Its Game
and Threats Got Personal, Dec. 13, 2006, http://www.messagelabs.com/
publishedcontent/publish/about us dotcomen/news events/pressjreleases/
DA_174397.html.
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on Section 7707. Finally, Part IV presents four issues with the CAN-SPAM
Act, relying on the statutory text and subsequent case decisions that support
the notion that it is a false hope.
I. WHAT IS SPAM?
How many times have you accessed your email, excited about the pros-
pect of receiving personal emails, and instead found emails for pornographic
websites, creative new diet plans, or, my personal favorite, the opportunity to
work from home and make six figures? These unwanted and annoying
emails exemplify a kind of email message that is known as "spam."
A. The Birth of Spam
"Spam" is defined as "unsolicited e-mail, often of a commercial nature,
sent indiscriminately to multiple mailing lists, individuals, or newsgroups."4
Spam has also been referred to as "junk email."5 The most common types of
spam are pyramid schemes, chain letters, get-rich-quick schemes, and adver-
tisements for pornographic websites.6 While spam typically evokes a nega-
tive connotation, it also refers to the commercial marketing efforts of
legitimate businesses.7 The term's origin results from a British skit about
Spam, the meat product, where a group of Vikings sing a chorus of "spam,
spam, spam.. ." increasing in volume to the point of drowning out all other
conversation taking place.8 The analogy was applied to spam email because
it "was drowning out normal discourse on the Internet."9 Spam's first occur-
rence is attributed to two immigration lawyers, who in 1994 used Usenet
newsgroups'o to send an advertising message about their law firm's services
4. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4TH ED. 2000),
available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/spam.
5. Id.
6. Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email ("CAUCE"), About Junk
Email/UCE/Spam, http://www.cauce.org/problem/about (last visited Dec. 1,
2007); see also OnGuard Online, Filter Tips: 10 Scams to Screen From Your
Email, http://onguardonline.gov/spam.html (listing the 10 common spain
scams) (last visited Dec. 1, 2007).
7. CAN-SPAM ACT OF 2003: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCI-
ENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, S. REP. No. 108-102, at 2 (2003), available at
http://www.spamlaws.com/pdf/report108-102.pdf.
8. MaryCLE, LLC v. First Choice Internet, Inc., 890 A.2d 818, 827 n.14 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2006); see also The Infamous Monty Python Spain Skit! http://
www.detritus.org/spam/skit.html (providing a transcript and streaming audio
of the skit) (last visited Dec. 1, 2007).
9. MaryCLE, 890 A.2d at 827 n.14.
10. Usenet is a world-wide discussion system consisting of newsgroups. Informa-
tion is posted to the newsgroups which then distribute it to all other intercon-
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to thousands of people."1 This one act "opened a Pandora's box" as copycats
began using the Internet to promote unwanted commercial solicitations.12
Eventually the wave of spai resulted in the destruction of the usefulness of
newsgroups and, as a result, spammers shifted their techniques to targeting
individual email addresses. 13 However, this evolution was initially limited
due to the difficulty of obtaining enough email addresses to justify the costs,
but as the Internet became a mass medium and more email addresses became
more accessible, the limitation was no longer an issue.14
B. How Does it Work?
One method employed by spammers to obtain email addresses is called
a "dictionary attack."15 Using special software, email addresses are automat-
ically generated and short bursts of communications are then sent to Internet
Service Providers ("ISPs") indicating a desire to contact the email ad-
dresses.' 6 If the ISP responds with a willingness to accept email for a certain
address, the software includes it in a list knowing it has generated a valid
address. 17 The spaminer can then generate emails to be sent to this list of
valid addresses.18 Another method used is a "web bug," or other tiny com-
puter code, which is activated when an email is opened by the recipient alert-
ing the sender that the address is valid.19 Additionally, this notifies the
sender about the recipient's propensity to open unsolicited email.20 The final
method, "Email harvesting," is the most common technique spanmers use to
obtain email addresses.21 Spammers utilize automated computer programs to
search certain areas on the Internet and then compile lists of discovered email
nected computer systems. What is Usenet?, http://www.faqs.org/faqs/usenet/
what-is/partl/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2007).
11. Netcraft, Spam's Tenth Birthday Today, http://news.netcraft.com/archives/
2004/03/05spamstenthbirthdayjoday.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
12. Sharael Feist, Newsmaker: The father of modern spam speaks, CNET NEWS,
Mar. 26, 2004, http://news.com.com/2008-1082-868483.html.
13. Netcraft, supra note 11.
14. Id.
15. CAN-SPAM ACT OF 2003: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCI-
ENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, S. REP. No. 108-102, at 3 (2003), available at
http://www.spamlaws.com/pdf/report108-102.pdf.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 3-4.
18. Id. at 4.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Federal Trade Commission, You've Got Spam: How to "Can" Unwanted Email
(2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/online/inbox.pdf.
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addresses.22 These areas include webpages, newsgroups, chat rooms, mes-
sage boards, online directories, and many other online sources. 23 While
email harvesting continues to be a source of information gathering, spam-
mers are using new and improved techniques to "breach the Internet's de-
fenses" and capture information.24 Spam harvesters often use "Botnets,"
which are small programs that secretly install themselves on thousands of
computers and then together utilize the collective power of this network to
harvest information.25 Today more than eighty percent of all spam originates
from botnets.26
C. What Are the Problems With Spam?
Spam presents a number of problems, some of which are not readily
apparent to an individual receiving it. The most obvious problem spam cre-
ates is reflected in its definition: the emails are unwanted, annoying solicita-
tions.27 This "annoyance factor" presents itself as Internet users must sift
through the multitude of spam emails just to locate legitimate personal
emails.28 This process also creates other smaller problems such as the loss of
productivity (cleaning out spam takes time) and the risk of deleting legiti-
mate emails.29 Also, even though broadband adoption is significant now,30
users who still use dial-up internet access at home or on business trips some-
22. Federal Trade Commission, Email Address Harvesting and the Effectiveness of
Anti-Spain Filters: A Report by the Federal Trade Commission's Division of
Marketing Practices (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/11/
spamharvest.pdf.
23. Id.
24. Peter Dasilva, "Botnets" committing more crimes, THE DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 7, 2007, at 18A.
25. Id; see generally Mindi McDowell, United States Computer Emergency Re-
sponse Team ("US-CERT"), Understanding Hidden Threats: Rootkits and
Botnets, http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/tips/ST06-001.html (last visited Dec. 1,
2007).
26. Dasilva, supra note 24.
27. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4TH ED. 2004),
supra note 4.
28. CAUCE, Annoyance Factor, http://www.cauce.org/problem/annoyancefactor
(last visited Dec. 1, 2007).
.29. Brien Posey, Combating SPAM Problems in a Corporate Environment, May
20, 2003, available at http://www.windowsecurity.com/whitepaper/anti-spam/
CombatingSPAMProblems in-a CorporateEnvironrent.html.
30. "Seventy-eight percent of the U.S. active home online population connect via
broadband." Enid Bums, ClickZ Network, Three-Quarters of U.S. Web Users
Are In the Fast Lane, Dec. 13, 2006, available at http://www.clickz.com/
showPage.html?page=3624188.
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times pay per minute.3' The time it takes these people to individually delete
each piece of spam then translates from a time cost to a financial cost.32
Another problem with spam is that it wastes and strains network resources in
two different places.33 First, spam creates problems during its journey from
the sender to the recipient as numerous systems in between are forced to
carry these unwanted messages. 34 As other systems are forced to handle
these emails, their resources are not being used to process other legitimate
("wanted") information.35 Recently, a single Internet service provider gener-
ated more than one billion spam email messages in twenty-four hours.36 Im-
agine the resources needed to process those and the amount of information
queued as a result. Second, spam creates a problem once it reaches its desti-
nation. As spam passes through multiple points prior to arriving at the Ex-
change Server where email is stored-i.e. the internet connection, firewall,
etc.-it consumes system resources such as bandwidth, processing power,
and memory.37 While the amount of resources consumed by one spam email
is not significant, problems arise when that number increases. 38 In addition,
once the spam reaches the Exchange Server, it must be stored and, as a result,
disk space on the server becomes an issue.39 The final problem created by
spain is that it shifts costs from the sender to the recipient. While it is rela-
tively inexpensive to send spam, it is costly for those that receive it.40 Costs
include both performance and financial costs. Performance costs are repre-
sented in terms of time and are exhibited when spam is being processed and
the processing time for legitimate email is slowed.41 Processing resources
are also used when filtering schemes are implemented, decreasing the num-
ber of available resources42 Additionally, as spam arrives at the destination,
31. CAN-SPAM ACT OF 2003: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCI-
ENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, S. REP. No. 108-102, at 7 (2003), available at
http://www.spamlaws.com/pdf/report108-102.pdf.
32. Id.
33. Webopedia, Spare, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/spam.html (last vis-
ited Dec. 1, 2007).
34. CAUCE, Waste of Others' Resources, http://www.cauce.org/problem/waste-
ofothersresources (last visited Dec. 1, 2007).
35. Id.
36. Dasilva, supra note 24.
37. Posey, supra note 29.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. CAUCE, Cost Shifting, http://www.cauce.org/problem/costshifting (last visited
Dec. 1 2007); see also S. REP. No. 108-102, supra note 7, at 12.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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it consumes the destination's bandwidth,43 decreasing the relative transfer
rate available for other information.44 "Massive volumes of spam can clog a
computer network, slowing Internet service for those that share the net-
work."45 These performance costs lead directly to financial costs as the
choice must be made between coping with slower resources and investing in
a technology upgrade simply to receive the same results that would be availa-
ble without spam.46 New equipment with larger capacity, implementing and
maintaining filtering systems, and additional customer service personnel are
a few of the high monetary costs. 47 Despite the solution adopted, there are
always costs.
II. CONTROLLING THE ASSAULT OF NON-SOLICITED PORNOGRAPHY
AND MARKETING ACT OF 2003
In 2003, the growing problems that spam created and the large costs
associated with fighting spam48 compelled Congress to enact the Controlling
the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act ("CAN-SPAM
Act").
A. Policy Behind the Act
In 2003, Congress understood the significance of email in the daily lives
of Americans.49 At the time, nearly half (140 million) of all Americans regu-
larly used email.50 Given this unrestricted passage, marketers quickly identi-
fied it as an optimal way to cheaply and quickly reach millions of people.51
As a result, Congress identified spam as "one of the most pervasive irtru-
sions in the lives of Americans."52 The volume of spam was rapidly increas-
43. Bandwidth: 2"The amount of data that can be transmitted in a fixed amount of
time...." Webopedia, Bandwidth, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/B/
bandwidth.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2007).
44. CAN-SPAM ACT OF 2003: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCI-
ENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, S. REP. No. 108-102, at 6 (2003), available at
http://www.spamlaws.com/pdf/report108-102.pdf.
45, Id.
46, Id; see also CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7701(6).
47. S. REP. No. 108-102 at 6.
48. Eighty percent of email received by AOL was spam and fighting spam would
cost U.S. companies more than $10 billion. Optinrealbig.com v. Ironport Sys.,
Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1039-40 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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ing and flooding the email boxes of Americans.53 Spam was also flooding
network systems of ISPs like AOL and Microsoft, as they were blocking 2.4
million spam messages a day.-4 Congress recognized the "significant eco-
nomic burden" spam was placing on ISPs and consumers. 55
While some spam messages were the product of marketing efforts by
legitimate businesses, Congress' primary concern focused on those who in-
tended to defraud consumers and to "prey on unsuspecting email users."56
Many times spammers would falsify or use misleading information in order
to disguise the content of their emails.57 By placing false information in the
email's "from", "reply-to", and "subject" lines, spammers could confuse con-
sumers as to the content contained in the email, the identity of the sender,
and the reply address.58 Consumers were forced to go through each individ-
ual email just to understand the content of the message. 59 Still, even after
understanding the content, the fraudulent sender and reply information pro-
vided no useable information allowing a consumer to contact the spammer to
request they stop sending emails.60 Given the increasing amount of spam
received by consumer's mailboxes, and their fraudulent nature, consumers
were becoming overwhelmed because of their inability to manage their
email.61 Congress identified additional problems resulting from fraudulent
emails.62 Many fraudulent schemes created risks to unsuspecting email users
in that they would be asked to provide sensitive information63-this is com-
monly referred to as phishing.64 Credit card and social security numbers
would be obtained, resulting in identity theft.65 In addition, spam would di-
rect consumers to websites where their computers would be infected with
viruses, spyware, Trojan horses, or other harmful computer codes.66
Pornographers would provide innocent subject lines such as "Hi, it's me" or
"Your order has been filled" only to have the emails contain objectionable
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2-3.
55. Id. at 6-7; see supra Part I.C.
56. S. REP. No. 108-102 at 2.






63. Id. at 5.
64. OnGuard Online, Phising, http://onguardonline.gov/phishing.html (last visited
Dec. 1, 2007).
65. S. REP. No. 108-102 at 5.
66. Id. at 6.
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images or automatically load pornographic websites.67 All fraudulent emails
made the already-difficult task of tracking down spammers even more expen-
sive and therefore improbable.68
Because of the problems span produced, Congress recognized a "sub-
stantial government interest in the regulation of commercial electronic mail
on a nationwide basis."69 Many states had already enacted their own legisla-
tion to regulate and reduce spam. 70 However, due to the different standards
and requirements of each of the states, Congress feared the legislation was
inadequate.7' Congress reasoned that the lack of geographic information in
email addresses created a setback for those honest businesses that could not
identify the state law to follow.72 So, in drafting federal legislation, Congress
kept two things in mind: (1) "senders of commercial [email] should not mis-
lead recipients as to the source or content of such mail," and (2) "recipients
of commercial [email] have a right to decline to receive additional commer-
cial [email] from the same source." 73 Ultimately, Congress aimed to create a
"Federal statutory regime that would give consumers the right to demand that
a spammer cease sending them messages, while creating civil and criminal
sanctions for the sending of spam meant to deceive recipients as to its source
or content." 74
B. Specific Sections of the Act
In creating the CAN-SPAM Act, there were four underlying purposes:
(1) to prohibit deception by the sender of both recipients and ISPs as to the
source and content of an email, (2) to require senders to provide a method for
recipients to request the abolition of future emails and to compel senders to
honor those requests, (3) to require the inclusion of a physical address and
the indication that the email is an advertisement or solicitation, and (4) to
prohibit businesses from "knowingly promoting or permitting" spam to be
sent of their behalf.75 Below are discussions of each section of the Act.
67. Id. at 4, 6.
68. Id. at 4-5.
69. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7701(b)(1).
70. Id. § 7701(a)(1 1); see also David Sorkin, Spain Laws, http://
www.spamlaws.com/state/index.shtml (last visited Dec. 1, 2007).
71. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7701(a)(11).
72. Id.
73. Id. §§ 7701(b)(2)-(3).
74. CAN-SPAM ACT OF 2003: REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON COMMERCE, SCI-
ENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, S. REP. No. 108-102, at 7 (2003), available at
http://www.spamlaws.com/pdf/report108-102.pdf.
75. Id. at 1.
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1. Sections 7701 - 7703
Section 7701 is an important administrative inclusion because it pro-
vides a summary of the findings and policies Congress considered in drafting
the Act.76 Congress understood the importance of email in the lives of Amer-
icans, the threat posed by the rapidly rising volume of spain, and the inability
of state legislation to effectively deal with the problem.77 In Section 7701(b),
Congress affirms their determinations of public policy implications, offering
a foundation that can be used to assist in the interpretation of the Act.78
Section 7702 is also an important, but not uncommon, administrative
inclusion, which defines key terms used throughout the Act.79 In total sev-
enteen terms are defined, including important terms such as "commercial
electronic message," 80 "initiate,"81 "internet access service,"82 "recipient,"83
and "sender."84 Section 7703 simply directs the United States Sentencing
Commission to review and possibly amend the sentencing guidelines for vio-
lations of Section 1037 of Title 18, United States Code85 in light of the new
CAN-SPAM Act.86
2. Section 7704
Section 7704 is the core clause of the CAN-SPAM Act. It specifies the
requirements that must be followed when attempting to initiate commercial
email messages. In general, this section prohibits false or misleading header
information,87 prohibits deceptive subject lines, requires the email to provide
recipients an opt-out option, and requires a clear and conspicuous identifier
76. See generally CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7701.
77. Id; see also supra Part II.A.
78. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7701(b).
79. See generally id. § 7702.
80. Id. § 7702 (2).
81. Id. § 7702 (9).
82. Id. § 7702 (11).
83. Id. § 7702 (14).
84. Id. § 7702 (16).
85. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1037 (LexisNexis 2007) (Prohibiting and penalizing fraud and
related activity in connection with electronic email).
86. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7703.
87. "[T]he source, destination, and routing information attached to an electronic
mail message, including the originating domain name and originating elec-
tronic mail address, and any other information that appears in the line identify-
ing, or purporting to identify, a person initiating the message." CAN-SPAM
Act, 15. U.S.C.S. § 7702(8).
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that the email is an advertisement or solicitation.88 The purpose of Section
7704(a)(1) is "to eliminate the use of inaccurate originating email addresses
that disguise the identities of the senders."89
Section 7704(a)(1) makes it unlawful for any person to "initiate9o the
transmission, to a protected computer, of a commercial electronic mail mes-
sage, or a transactional or relationship message, that contains, or is accompa-
nied by, header information that is materially false or materially
misleading."9' Materially misleading header information would include in-
stances where the originating email address, domain name, or IP address are
technically correct, but they were obtained under "false or fraudulent pre-
tenses or representations." 92 It also includes a person knowingly using a dif-
ferent computer to relay or transmit a commercial message and then failing
to accurately identify the original computer used for the transmission.93 In
all other instances, violations of Section 7704(a)(1) require that the alteration
or concealment of header information prevent recipients from responding to
the sender of the commercial message or prevent third parties (i.e. those en-
forcing the Act) from identifying, locating, investigating, or responding to
the sender of the commercial email.94 It is important to note that the mere
existence of falsities in the header information is not sufficient, as they must
"prevent" identification, investigation, etc.95 The Fourth Circuit reinforced
this notion when it held that the incorrect identification of an originating
server and the use of a non-functional address in the "from" line did not meet
the "materially false or materially misleading" requirement.96 The Court de-
88. Federal Trade Commission, The CAN-SPAM Act: Requirements for Commer-
cial Emailers 2 (Apr. 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/
buspubs/canspam.pdf.
89. CAN-SPAM ACT OF 2003: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCi-
ENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, S. REP. No. 108-102, at 17 (2003), available at
http://www.spamlaws.com/pdf/report108-102.pdf.
90. The term "initiate" is defined in the Act so that liability exists under two differ-
ent circumstances. See CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7702(9). First, under
normal circumstances, a person can be liable if they originate or transmit the
commercial message themselves. Id. Second, a person can also be liable if
they "procure" the origination or transmission of the commercial message. Id.
This is the "procure" clause. To "procure" means to "intentionally pay or pro-
vide other consideration to, or induce, another person to initiate" a commercial
message on one's behalf. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7702(12).
91. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7704(a)(1).
92. Id. § 7704(a)(1)(A).
93. Id. § 7704(a)(1)(C).
94. Id. § 7704(a)(6) (providing the definition of "materially").
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termined that despite these two inaccuracies, the headers of the emails sent
by a cruise traveling website were "replete with accurate identifiers of the
sender" providing plenty of methods to "identify, locate, or respond to the
sender or to investigate an alleged violation of the CAN-SPAM Act."97 The
messages contained links for removal from future mailing lists, links to the
main website, toll-free telephone numbers, a mailing address, a local tele-
phone number, and several references to the domain name.98 The Court pos-
ited about the needless inclusion of the materiality requirement if they were
to adopt the interpretation that "inaccuracies in a message containing so
many valid identifiers could be described as 'materially false or materially
misleading.' "99
Section 7704(a)(2) prohibits the use of deceptive subject headings and
requires that the person who initiates the commercial message know or
should know-"implied on the basis of objective circumstances"-that the
subject headings would likely mislead a recipient "about a material fact re-
garding the contents or subject matter of the message."100 Congress did not
intend for minor typographical errors or "truly accidental mislabeling" to cre-
ate liability.O1
Section 7704(a)(3) requires all commercial e-mail to contain "a func-
tioning return electronic mail address or other Internet-based mechanism"
that allows the recipient to opt-out of future messages.102 The return e-mail
address must be able to receive recipients' messages for no less than thirty
days after the original commercial email was sent, 0 3 but temporary unavaila-
bility due to technical problems beyond the sender's control are exempt. 0 4
Congress recognized the potential volume of responses a sender could re-
ceive after sending unwanted commercial e-mail and therefore, it included
protections for those who act in good faith.105 However, this exemption does
not protect those that craft systems unequipped to handle responses, nor
those that do not remedy the situation in a reasonable amount of time.106
Section 7704(a)(4) continues by prohibiting the transmission of commercial
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 358.
100. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7704(a)(2).
101. CAN-SPAM ACT OF 2003: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCI-
ENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, S. REP. No. 108-102, at 17 (2003), available at
http://www.spamlaws.com/pdf/report108-102.pdf.
102. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7704(a)(3)(A).
103. Id. § 7704(a)(3)(A)(ii).
104. Id. § 7704(a)(3)(C).
105. S. REP. No. 108-102 at 17.
106. Id.
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e-mail to a recipient within ten business daysl07 of receiving an opt-out re-
quest.108 This applies to a single sender of commercial email, one who sends
commercial email on behalf of a sender, and one who provides or selects
emails for the sender; though the last two require actual or implied knowl-
edge that the recipient made an opt-out request.109 Congress added the addi-
tional knowledge requirement "to ensure that persons providing email
marketing services will be responsible for making a good faith inquiry of
their clients ... to determine whether there are recipients who should not be
emailed."I0 Also prohibited is the sale, lease, exchange or transfer of an
email address.'l Congress wanted to prevent an opt-out request from being
treated as a "confirmation of a 'live' email address," generating information
then sold to other spammers." 12
Section 7704(a)(5) requires that all commercial emails"13 contain "clear
and conspicuous identification that the message is an advertisement or solici-
tation," "clear and conspicuous notice" of the ability to opt-out of future
emails, and "a valid physical postal address of the sender."1"4Section 7704(b)
classifies several spammer techniques, such as address harvesting, dictionary
attacks, automated creation of multiple email accounts, and unauthorized re-
lays or retransmissions, as "aggravated violations.""15 People using these
techniques in violation of Section 7704(b) would be subject to "sharply in-
creased liability."116 Finally, Section 7704(d) imposes a "requirement to
place warning labels on commercial [emails] containing sexually oriented
material."1 17
107. The Federal Trade Commission, through regulation, can modify the ten busi-
ness day requirement to a more reasonable period of time depending on factors
including the burdens imposed on senders of lawful commercial email. CAN-
SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7704(c).
108. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7704(a)(4).
109. Id.
110. S. REP. No. 108-102 at 18.
111. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7704(a)(4)(A)(iv).
112. S. REP. No. 108-102 at 18.
113. This section does not apply to commercial emails sent to recipients who have
given prior affirmative consent. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S.
§ 7704(a)(5)(B).
114. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7704(a)(5)(A)(i)-(iii).
115. Id. § 7704(b).
116. S. REP. No. 108-102 at 18.
117. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.CS. § 7704(d).
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3. Section 7705
Offered as an Amendment,18 Congress added Section 7705 to hold peo-
ple liable if they promote their business, or allow it to be promoted, in spam
emails which violate Section 7704(a)(1).119 This section does not rely on the
Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC") ability to find out who "initiated" the
spain emails.120 Instead, the purpose of this section was "to give the FTC a
tool to more effectively 'follow the money' and enforce the law against busi-
nesses that hire spammers to send email to consumers in large volumes with
deliberately falsified header information."121 Section 7705 also provides an
alternative to the more difficult standard necessary in Section 7704 requiring
proof that the business "procured" the spammer to send email on its behalf.122
However, there are important limitations included in the section.
First, section 7705(a) only applies to emails that contain false header
information.123 This limitation protects legitimate marketers and retailers
from violating this section given that they would not falsify the heading in-
formation in legitimate commercial emails.124 Second, promoted businesses
are held liable only if: 1) they knew or should have known that their business
was being promoted in falsified spain emails; 2) they received or are ex-
pected to receive an economic benefit; and 3) they took no reasonable action
to stop the spain or report it to the FTC. 125 The purpose of the last criterion is
to shield legitimate marketers from prosecution in the event their business is
promoted using "spoof emails."126 Third, section 7705 provides a safe harbor
to third-parties who supply goods or services to persons in violation of sec-
tion 7705(a). But this section does not protect third-parties who own more
than fifty-percent of the business in question or those who benefited from
their knowledge of the falsified spam.127 Section 7705(a) offers protection to
118. S. REP. No. 108-102 at 19.
119. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7705(a).
120. S. REP. No. 108-102 at 19.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. CAN-SPAM Act 15 U.S.C.S. § 7705(a); see also S. REP. No. 108-102 at 19-
20.
124. S. REP. No. 108-102 at 20.
125. CAN-SPAM Act 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 7705(a)(1)-(3).
126. Spoof emails are a popular tactic used by spammers: they send unauthorized
emails to consumers using the corporate name or an employee's email address.
The email looks legitimate and tricks the consumer into believing the company
sent the email. See S. REP. No. 108-102, at 20.
127. CAN-SPAM Act 15 U.S.C.S. § 7705(b).
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third-parties such as web hosts, landlords, and equipment lessors.128 Finally,
this section is limited to enforcement by the FTC.129
4. Section 7706
Section 7706 is the enforcement clause, specifying those who have
rights to enforce the provisions of the CAN-SPAM Act. While consumers do
have statutory rights under the Act,130 the Act does not give consumers a
private right of action.131 Instead, the Act provides standing to four different
groups. First, section 7706 provides authority to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion ("FTC") to enforce the Act.1 32 The FTC regulates violations of the
CAN-SPAM Act under the guise of Section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act ("FTC Act"), 133 treating violations as if they were unfair or
deceptive acts. 134 The FTC is afforded all of the "jurisdictional, remedial,
and civil enforcement provisions of the FTC Act."'135 Second, section 7706
provides enforcement authority to certain other enumerated agencies.136
These agencies include the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 137 the
Securities and Exchange Commission,138 the Secretary of Transportation,139
and the Federal Communications Commission.140 Section 7706 also permits
these agencies to exercise any authority granted to them by other laws.' 41
Third, section 7706 grants authority to an "attorney general of a State, or an
official or agency of a State" to bring "a civil action on behalf of the re-
128. S. REP. No. 108-102 at 20.
129. CAN-SPAM Act 15 U.S.C.S. § 7705(c).
130. See id. § 7701(b)(3).
131. Madorsky v. Does, No. 1:06CV0123, 2006 WL 1587349, at *2 (N.D. Ohio
June 8, 2006) (holding provisions of CAN-SPAM Act did not provide pro se
plaintiff standing to file private cause of action).
132. CAN-SPAM Act 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 7706(a), (d).
133. See generally 15 U.S.C.S. § 57a(a)(1)(B).
134. CAN-SPAM Act 15 U.S.C.S. § 7706(a).
135. CAN-SPAM ACT OF 2003: REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON COMMERCE, SCI-
ENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, S. REP. No. 108-102, at 20 (2003), available at
http://www.spanlaws.com/pdf/reportl08-102.pdf.; see also CAN-SPAM Act
15 U.S.C.S. § 7706(d).
136. CAN-SPAM Act 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 7706(b), (c).
137. Id. § 7706(b)(1)(A).
138. Id. §§ 7706(b)(3)-(5).
139. Id. § 7706(b)(7).
140. Id. § 7706(b)(10).
141. Id. § 7706(c).
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sidents of the State in a district court of the United States of appropriate
jurisdiction." 142
The Act allows injunctive relief as well as actual or statutory dam-
ages.143 For injunctive relief, section 7706 does not require that the plaintiff
allege or prove the state of mind required in sections 7704(a)(1)(C), (a)(2),
(a)(4)(A)(ii)-(iv), (b)(l)(A), or (b)(3).144 However, except as provided in sec-
tions 7704(a)(1)(C), (a)(2), (a)(4)(A)(ii)-(iv), (b)(1)(A), or (b)(3), the Act re-
quires the plaintiff to show that the defendant had actual or implied
knowledge of the action violating the CAN-SPAM Act in order to recover
monetary damages.145 Finally, section 7706 allows internet service providers
(ISPs) to bring civil actions "in any district court of the United States with
jurisdiction over the defendant."146 Civil actions may be sought for viola-
tions of Section 7704(a)(1), 7704(b), 7704(d), and 7704(a)(2)-(5).147 How-
ever, Section 7706 imposes two additional hurdles that ISPs must meet in
order to prove violations within Section 7704. First, for violations of Section
7704(a)(2)-(5), it must be additionally established that there was a pattern or
practice of violations. 148 For example, the Fourth Circuit held that the mere
allegation by an ISP of a failure to remove a single email address, particu-
larly in the absence of any allegation of a failure to comply with other re-
quests could not establish "a pattern or practice" of violations.149 Second,
there is a special definition for "procure" that holds that to be liable under the
"procure" clause,150 the defendant must have actual knowledge, or have con-
sciously avoided the knowledge, that the person sending the emails was vio-
lating the CAN-SPAM Act.151 If the ISP can overcome either of these two
hurdles, they can request injunctive relief, actual damages or statutory
damages. 152
142. Id. § 7706(f)(1).
143. Id. § 7706(f)(1), (3).
144. Id. § 7706(0(2).
145. Id. § 7706(f)(9).
146. Id. § 7706(g).
147. Id. § 7706(g)(1).
148. Id.; see also Omega World Travel v. Mummagraphics, Inc., 469 F.3d 348, 358
(4th Cir. 2006).
149. Omega World Travel, 469 F.3d at 358.
150. See Federal Trade Commission, supra note 88.
151. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7706(g)(2); see also Hypertouch, Inc. v. Ken-
nedy-Western Univ., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14673 at 15-16 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(finding no evidence that an online university knew or avoided knowing that
their marketing agents would violate the CAN-SPAM Act).
152. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7706(g)(1).
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5. Section 7707
This section is known as the preemption clause of the CAN-SPAM Act.
It will be discussed in more detail below.I53
6. Section 7708, 7709 & 7710
Sections 7708-7710 called for reports to be created soon after the CAN-
SPAM Act was enacted. One report was to be submitted to both the Senate
and House of Representatives within six months detailing a plan and timeta-
ble for establishing a Do-Not-Email registry.154 The second report called for
a "detailed analysis of the effectiveness and enforcement" of, as well as sug-
gestions for modifications to, the CAN-SPAM Act and was to be submitted
within 24 months.'55A third report, to be submitted within nine months,
called for the creation of a system that would reward those who supplied
information concerning violations of the CAN-SPAM Act.156 The final re-
port, to be submitted within eighteen months, required the detailing of a plan
that would require commercial electronic mail (spam) to be identifiable from
its subject line.157
7. Section 7711, 7712 & 7713
Section 7711 gives the FTC the ability to issue regulations in order to
implement the provisions of the CAN-SPAM Act;158 however, the regula-
tions cannot require the insertion into any particular part of an email of "spe-
cific words, characters, marks, or labels" or those requirements set forth in
Section 7704(a)(5)(A).159 The CAN-SPAM Act specifies its application to
153. See infra Part III.B.
154. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7708; The report was completed and published
in June 2004. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, NATIONAL Do NOT EMAIL
REGISTRY: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
reports/dneregistry/report.pdf.
155. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7709; The report was completed and published
in December 2005. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, EFFECTIVENESS AND
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CAN-SPAM ACT: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (2005),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/canspam05/051220canspamrpt.pdf.
156. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7710; The report was completed in September
2004. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, A CAN-SPAM INFORMANT REWARD
SYSTEM: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/re-
ports/rewardsys/040916rewardsysrpt.pdf.
157. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7710; The report was completed in June 2005.
See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, SUBJECT LINE LABELING AS A WEAPON
AGAINST SPAM: A CAN-SPAM ACT REPORT TO CONGRESS (2005), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/canspam05/050616canspanrpt.pdf.
158. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7711(a).
159. Id. § 7711(b).
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the wireless realm by expressly stating its inability to "preclude or override"
sections of the Communications Act of 1934160 and the Telemarketing and
Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act. 161,162 The CAN-SPAM Act also
calls on the Federal Communications Commission to publicize rules aimed at
protecting consumers from unwanted "mobile" service messages. 163 Finally,
the last section, Section 7713, is a separability clause allowing the portions of
the Act not at issue to remain effective in the event that a provision or an
application of the Act is held invalid.164
III. THE CAN-SPAM ACT § 7707
An important section in the CAN-SPAM Act that requires a separate
analysis is the preemption clause. A brief discussion of Federal preemption
is followed by an extensive look at what is contained in the preemption
clause of the CAN-SPAM Act. Following this analysis is a look at White
Buffalo, a case that wrestled with two conflicting interpretations inherent in
the preemption doctrine and Omega World Travel, a case that further defined
an exception to the preemption clause.
A. Preemption Precedence
Federal preemption stems from the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution. This clause provides that "[t]his Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall
be the supreme Law of the Land... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."165 From this clause our jurispru-
dence has established three circumstances in which a federal law preempts a
state law.166 First, and easiest to apply, is referred to as express preemption
and arises when Congress has explicitly defined the extent to which the Fed-
eral law preempts state laws. 167 Under this circumstance, Congress has made
its intent known through the statutory language.168 The second circumstance,
field preemption, occurs when state laws attempt to regulate conduct in a
field that Congress intended federal law to regulate exclusively.169 This in-
tention manifests itself when the "scheme of federal regulation [is] so perva-
160. 47 U.S.C.S § 227 (LexisNexis 2007).
161. 15 U.S.C.S § 6102 (LexisNexis 2007).
162. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7712(a).
163. Id. § 7712(b).
164. Id. § 7713.
165. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
166. English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990).
167. Id; see e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-100 (1983).
168. English, 496 U.S. at 79.
169. Id; see e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
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sive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it" or when federal interest in a field is "so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws
on the same subject."170 Finally, the last circumstance in which federal law
preempts state law is conflict preemption.171 Under conflict preemption, a
federal law preempts a state law when it becomes impossible for one to si-
multaneously comply with both the federal and state laws,172 or when a state
law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."173
Fundamental to all of these situations is the question of Congressional
intent to preempt state law. 174 When evaluating circumstances under the
Supremacy Clause, the underlying assumption as to federal preemption is
that Congress does not intend to displace state law.175 However, if preemp-
tion was Congress's "clear and manifest purpose[,J" a federal act will super-
sede state laws or regulations.176
B. Section 7707
Referred to as the preemption clause, section 7707 expresses the CAN-
SPAM Act's effect on other federal and state laws. As for federal laws,
section 7707 provides that nothing in the Act interferes with the enforcement
of Sections 223177 and 231178 of the Communications Act of 1934, or federal
criminal statutes, including United States Code chapter 71 of title 18 relating
to obscenity179 and chapter 110 of title 18 relating to the sexual exploitation
of children.18,18 The Act also does not interfere with the FTC's ability to
enforce actions under the Federal Trade Commission Act for "materially
false or deceptive representations or unfair practices in commercial electronic
mail messages."182
170. English, 496 U.S. at 79 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).
171. Indus. Truck Ass'n v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1997).
172. English, 496 U.S. at 78-79.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); see also Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 507 U.S. 218, 224
(1993) (stating the Court's reluctance to infer preemption).
176. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
177. 47 U.S.C.S. § 223 (LexisNexis 2007).
178. Id. § 231.
179. 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 1460-1470.
180. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260A.
181. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7707(a)(1).
182. Id. § 7707(a)(2).
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The preemption clause does provide for displacement of state laws,
however, by stating:
This Act supersedes any statute, regulation, or rule of a State or
political subdivision of a State that expressly regulates the use of
electronic mail to send commercial messages, except to the extent
that any such statute, regulation, or rule prohibits falsity or decep-
tion in any portion of a commercial electronic mail message or
information attached thereto.183
The state laws that the Act preempts are those that require specific la-
bels on some or all commercial emails, require specific content to be con-
tained in commercial emails, or define specified formats that commercial
emails must follow.184 Congress's goal behind section 7707(b)(1) was to cre-
ate a national standard to eliminate the difficulty legitimate businesses had in
determining which State laws to adhere to in their business dealings.185 Con-
gress includedan exemption for state laws that prohibit falsity or deception
because Congress understood that legitimate businesses would not be using
deception in their emails, and therefore would be unaffected by the exemp-
tion. In addition, Congress exempted state laws that can apply to electronic
mail, but are not specific to it, like contract or tort law.186 Finally, the Act
does not affect the "adoption, implementation, or enforcement by a provider
of Internet access service of a policy declining to transmit, route, relay, han-
dle, or store certain types of electronic mail messages."187 Congress did not
want to impede an ISP's "efforts to filter or block emails traversing their
systems."88
C. White Buffalo Ventures v. University of Texas at Austin
While the preemption clause's statutory language appears to be clear,
two important cases have sought to further explain its application. The first
case involved the University of Texas's (UT) regulation of unsolicited com-
mercial emails from White Buffalo Ventures, LLC (White Buffalo).189 At
183. Id. § 7707 (b)(1).
184. CAN-SPAM ACT OF 2003: REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON COMMERCE, SCI-
ENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, S. REP. No. 108-102, at 21 (2003), available at
http://www.spamlaws.com/pdf/report108-102.pdf.
185. Id.
186. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7707(b)(2).
187. Id. § 7707(c).
188. S. REP. No. 108-102 at 22.
189. White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. University of Texas at Austin, 420 F.3d 366,
368 (5th Cir. 2005).
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issue, with regards to the CAN-SPAM Act,190 was whether federal law pre-
empted UT's internal anti-spam policy.191 This represented the first case in
which a court evaluated the preemption clause of the CAN-SPAM Act.192
The court likened the case to a Venn diagram,93 where one circle represents
state action that is expressly preempted by federal law, the other circle repre-
sents Internet Access Providers (IAP, aka ISP) that are expressly exempted
from preemption, and the common middle section that represents state enti-
ties that are themselves considered IAPs.194 It was up to the Fifth Circuit to
decide which circle controlled the middle section.
UT provided free Internet access along with email addresses at the do-
main "utexas.edu" for their faculty, staff, and students. 195 The email ac-
counts were stored on one of UT's 178 servers and were accessible either: 1)
on school property through wired, authenticated ports or through wireless
connectivity, or 2) by logging in remotely using an individual's own IAP.196
Through their general policy against solicitation, UT instituted procedures
that combat unsolicited emails sent to the domain "utexas.edu."197 Specifi-
cally, whenever complaints, system monitors, or other devices indicated the
existence of unsolicited emails, the technology department ("ITC") worked
to block or stop the transmission of these emails, sometimes providing notice
to the sender.198
White Buffalo operated an online dating service at "longhornsin-
gles.com" that targeted University of Texas students. 199 In February 2003,
utilizing a Public Information Act, White Buffalo sought "all non-confiden-
tial, non-exempt email addresses" from UT.200 UT complied and turned over
all qualifying email addresses to White Buffalo.201 A couple of months later,
190. There was also a second issue involving a First Amendment claim. The issue
before the court was whether UT's anti-spain policy violated White Buffalo's
First Amendment right. See id. at 374-78. The focus of this comment is only
the issue involving the preemption clause of the CAN-SPAM Act.
191. Id. at 368-69.
192. Id. at 371.
193. Id. at 374, n.14. ("A Venn diagram uses circles to represent sets, with the posi-
tion and overlap of the circles indicating the relationship between the sets").
194. Id. at 373-74.
195. Id. at 369.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 368 n.2
198. Id.
199. Id. at 368.
200. Id. at 369.
201. Id.
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White Buffalo started sending legal2o2 commercial spain to numerous people
in the UT community.203 After receiving several complaints about the
emails, UT's investigation revealed that White Buffalo had sent tens of
thousands of unsolicited emails to UT email-account holders. 20 4 Thereupon,
UT sent a cease and desist letter, but White Buffalo refused to comply.205
They then blocked all emails from White Buffalo's IP address sent to ad-
dresses containing "@utexas.edu."206
White Buffalo responded by obtaining a temporary restraining order in
state court. 207 However, UT removed the cause to federal court for a prelimi-
nary injunction hearing, and the district court denied the injunction.208 Sub-
sequently both parties conducted discovery and both moved for summary
judgment.209 At the center of the case was the CAN-SPAM Act's preemption
clause which once again states:
This chapter supersedes any statute, regulation, or rule of a State
or political subdivision of a State that expressly regulates the use
of electronic mail to send commercial messages, except to the ex-
tent that any such statute, regulation, or rule prohibits falsity or
deception in any portion of a commercial electronic message or
information attached thereto.210
White Buffalo's position was that UT was a state actor and the emails
were not false or fraudulent,211 so the CAN-SPAM Act preempted UT's in-
ternal anti-spain regulations and prevented UT from blocking longhornsin-
gles.com emails to utexas.edu users. 21 2 Given that no court had ever
considered the preemption clause,2' 3 White Buffalo relied solely on the text
202. The court presumed the emails to be legal "based on the record, the parties'
agreement, and the absence of any challenge." Id. at 369 n.5.




207. Id. at 370.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7707(b)(1).
211. See supra note 204.
212. White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 371.
213. Id; Even though the Fifth Circuit had no knowledge of another court consider-
ing the preemption clause, the Eastern District of Washington had in fact ap-
plied the clause a month earlier. See Gordon v. Impulse Marketing Group, Inc.,
375 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1044-46 (E.D. Wash. 2005).
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of the clause to support their position.214 The district court disagreed and
granted summary judgment to UT on the basis of four determinations.215 The
court held that: 1) Congress did not intend, in passing the CAN-SPAM Act,
to "preempt technological approaches to combating spam," 2) Section
7707(c) specifically exempts UT from preemption, 3) UT's anti-spain policy
is a part of the larger anti-solicitation policy and under Section 7707(b)(2) is
exempt from preemption, and 4) Section 7707(b)(1) does not apply because
UT's anti-spain policy is not a "statute, regulation, or rule of a State or politi-
cal subdivision of a state."216 In the Fifth Circuit's analysis, they did not
specifically address all of these determinations in their affirmation of the
district court's summary judgment, instead taking a different approach and
discussing them when appropriate.217
Two meager attempts by UT to claim an exemption from the preemp-
tion clause were quickly disposed of by the Fifth Circuit. First, UT argued
that Section 7707(b)(1) applied to state political subdivisions and that ITS
was not a political subdivision of the state. 218 The Fifth Circuit found the
argument meritless, as UT is a public school.219 Second, UT attempted to
convince the court that the CAN-SPAM Act's preemption clause pertained to
state rules relating to the "sending" of unsolicited commercial emails.220 UT
pointed to Congress's use of the word "send" in the Act and contended that
the CAN-SPAM Act only regulated the sending of spain, and not the receipt;
ITS's anti-spam policy regulated only the "receipt" of spam.221 The Fifth
Circuit "decline[d] to imbue the word 'send' with the particular significance
UT urge[d]."222 Instead, the court recognized that all email is both "sent" and
"received," and an emphasis on a distinction between the two should not be
made under this particular provision.223
With respect to the CAN-SPAM Act, the Fifth Circuit devoted a major-
ity of its discussion to White Buffalo's argument that Section 7707(b)(1)
expressly preempts UT's internal regulations. The court recognized and cre-
ated the Venn diagram idea by pointing out that Section 7707, in addition to
214. White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 371.
215. Id. at 370-71.
216. Id. at 371.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 372 n.10.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 372 n.l1.
222. Id. at 372.
223. Id. at 372 n.11.
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creating preemption, also identifies a set of entities that are exempt from any
preemptive effect.224 Specifically,
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to have any effect on the
lawfulness or unlawfulness, under any other provision of law, of
the adoption, implementation, or enforcement by a provider of In-
ternet access service of a policy of declining to transmit, route,
relay, handle, or store certain types of electronic mail messages. 225
In the creation of Section 7707, Congress failed to contemplate, as this
case presented, the instance when the state actor also acts as an IAP.226 As a
result of the two competing subsections, the court identified two potential
interpretations of the Act: 1) "state entities may not regulate commercial
speech except where that regulation relates to the authenticity of the speech's
source and content," and 2) "state entities may implement a variety of non-
authenticity related commercial speech restrictions, provided the state entity
implementing them is an Internet access provider."27 The Fifth Circuit be-
gan with the understanding that preemption jurisprudence has established an
assumption against preemption of state law.228 The court framed it as a "tie
goes to the state" analysis.229 Given the jurisprudence of a "strong" presump-
tion against preemption and the "textual ambiguity" of Section 7707, the
court determined that the clause exempting lAPs should prevail over the pre-
emption clause.230 The court next examined whether UT qualified as an lAP,
falling within the exception granted in Section 7707. The district court found
that UT "is certainly a provider of Internet access service to its students, if
not to its employees and faculty, so it is expressly authorized under the stat-
ute to implement policies declining to transmit, route, relay, handle, or store
spam."231 While the district court felt "certain" that UT qualified as an lAP,
the Fifth Circuit pointed out that the district court made its determination
without any reference to the definition provided in the statute.232 Therefore,
the court focused its attention on the statutory definition, which defines lAPs
as "a service that enables users to access content, information, electronic
mail, or other services offered over the Internet, and may also include access
224. Id. at 371; see also CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7707(c).
225. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S § 7707(c).
226. White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 372.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 370.
229. Id.
230. The court actually declared twice that UT's internal anti-spam policy was not
preempted by the CAN-SPAM Act before determining whether UT qualified as
an lAP. See id. at 372-73.
231. Id. at 373.
232. Id.
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to proprietary content, information, and other services as part of a package of
services offered to consumers."233 Under this definition, UT did provide In-
ternet access service anytime an individual sat down at a computer terminal
on campus. 234 However, the court carefully pointed out that even though
individuals can access their email remotely, this did not affect the status of
being an IAP.235 The court held that UT qualified under the Section 7707(c)
exception because they were "hard-pressed to find that providing email ac-
counts and email access [did] not bring UT within the statutory definition" of
an IAP.236 The Fifth Circuit concluded with an interesting public policy ar-
gument that it would be an "unusual policy" to find UT's anti-spain regula-
tions preempted, but allow a private educational institution, under the same
facts, to protect the interests of its online community.37 However, the court
was quick to point out that the "prudence of the policy" did not predetermine
their decision that UT should be considered an IAP under the Act.238
D. Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc.
The second case involved Mummagraphics' receipt of email advertise-
ments about cruise vacations from Omega World Travel (Omega) through
Cruise.com, a wholly owned subsidiary.239 Mummagraphics sought statutory
damages, alleging that Omega's emails violated both the CAN-SPAM Act
and Oklahoma law regulating emails.240 The court's interpretation and appli-
cation of the CAN-SPAM Act's preemption clause is the focus of this
section.
Mummagraphics was an Oklahoma company that provided online ser-
vices such as hosting webpages, registering domain names, and setting up
computer servers. 241 Their domain name was webguy.net and they used the
233. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S § 7702(11) (importing the definition from the
Communication Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(4)). The court actually
refered to the use of the Internet Tax Freedom Act for the definition; however,
the language in both acts is identical.
234. White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 373.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 373 n.13.
238. Id.
239. Omega World Travel v. Mummagraphics, Inc., 469 F.3d 348, 350 (4th Cir.
2006). There were three named appellees in the suit: Omega World Travel,
Inc., Gloria Bohan, Omega's president and founder, and Cruise.com, the
wholly owned subsidiary of Omega. For purposes of this comment, Omega
will be used to collectively refer to all three appellees.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 350-51.
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email account "inbox@webguy.net" for company purposes.242 Cruise.com,
operating online, sold cruise vacations and advertised by sending emails
called "E-deals."243 Between December 29, 2004, and February 9, 2005,
Omega sent eleven "E-deals" to Mummagraphics's "inbox@webguy.net."244
Also during this period, Mummagraphics expressed to Omega through tele-
phone conversations and letter correspondence their desire not to receive any
more "E-deal" messages and their intention to file suit if the emails contin-
ued.245 When they continued to receive "E-deals"emails after this plea and
Omega refused their settlement offer, Mummagraphics posted information
pertaining to Omega on their "anti-spam" website, labeling Omega as a
"spammer" who violated state and federal law. 24 6 This action resulted in the
commencement of a defamation suit against Mummagraphics, who re-
sponded with counterclaims against Omega for violating federal and
Oklahoma law. 24 7 On appeal, only the counterclaims came before the Fourth
Circuit.248 With respect to the counterclaims, Mummagraphics alleged that
the "E-deals" emails "contained actionable inaccuracies and that [Omega]
failed to comply with federal and state requirements that they stop sending
messages to [Mummagraphics]."249 After both parties requested summary
judgment, the district court granted summary judgment for Omega, holding
that (1) the CAN-SPAM Act preempted Mummagraphics' Oklahoma state
law claims, and (2) Omega did not violate the CAN-SPAM Act. 25o The dis-
trict court held that the Oklahoma state law claims were preempted "insofar
as they applied to immaterial representations."251 Mummagraphics chal-




246. Id. at 351-52.
247. Id. at 352; The primary Oklahoma provision Mummagraphics relied on
provides:
It shall be unlawful for a person to initiate an electronic mail message that
the sender knows, or has reason to know:
(I) Misrepresents any information in identifying the point of origin or the
transmission path of the electronic mail message;
(2) Does not contain information identifying the point of origin or the
transmission path of the electronic mail message; or
(3) Contains false, malicious, or misleading information which purposely
or negligently injures a person.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 776.1A (Supp. 2008).
248. Omega World Travel, 469 F.3d at 352.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 353.
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lenged this determination relying on the CAN-SPAM Act's exclusion from
preemption for state laws that "prohibit falsity or deception."252 In other
words, the Fourth Circuit needed to decide if the exception for state laws
prohibiting "falsity" or "deception" gave power to the states to prohibit im-
material or bare errors in emails.253
The Fourth Circuit began their analysis of the CAN-SPAM Act's pre-
emption clause by underscoring their respect for the basic principles of pre-
emption and a presumption against federal preemption, but in the end they
agreed with the district court that preemption prevails.254 In their interpreta-
tion of the preemption clause, the Fourth Circuit did not believe the excep-
tion provided for states was straightforward and their analysis involved an
attempt to define "falsity" and "deception."255 The Court quickly deter-
mined, without analysis, that "deception" requires more than bare error and
proceeded to devote the majority of their time defining "falsity."256
To determine the expansiveness of "falsity" the Fourth Circuit first con-
sidered the word in isolation.57 Using dictionary definitions, the Court was
unable to unambiguously define the intended scope of "falsity" because it
recognized that "falsity" can be defined as simply "untrue," but it could also
"convey an element of tortiousness or wrongfulness."258 Next, the Court pro-
ceeded to consider the word in relation to the whole clause, using the maxim
"noscitur a sociis" ("a word is generally known by the company that it
keeps"). It was here that the Court began to find support that "falsity" did
not refer to bare errors.2 59 "Deception" is one of the several tort actions
based upon misrepresentations and the pairing of "falsity" with it suggests
that Congress intended for "falsity" to refer to torts involving misrepresenta-
tion, and not to other errors.26o Additionally, in Section 7704(a)(1), Congress
uses the title "[pirohibition of false or misleading transmission information,"
to expressly "prohibit[ ] only header information that is 'materially' false or
'materially misleading."261 Utilizing the "normal rule of statutory construc-
tion" where "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in-
252. Id.; see CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7707(b)(1).
253. Omega World Travel, 469 F.3d at 353.
254. Id. at 352-53.






261. Id. (emphasis added by court); see also CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S.
§ 7704(a)(1).
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tended to have the same meaning,"262 this link to materiality suggests once
again that Congress did not intend "falsity" to include bare errors.263 Regard-
less of whether the link is to deception or materiality, the Fourth Circuit
found support that bare errors were not intended to be covered by Congress's
use of the word "falsity" in the preemption exception.264
The Fourth Circuit strengthened their conclusion by discussing the pol-
icy elements behind the creation of the CAN-SPAM Act.265 The Court iden-
tified, through the enacted findings in Section 7701, Congress's balancing
between "preserving a potentially useful commercial tool and preventing its
abuse."266 Congress struck this balance by targeting "only emails containing
something more than an isolated error."267 The court expressed concern that
this balance would be undermined if "falsity" were to encompass bare er-
rors.268 Also, the national standard Congress intended to create with the Act
would be reduced to irrelevancy; "the strict liability standard imposed by a
state such as Oklahoma would become a de facto national standard."269 The
exception to preemption would thus be "a loophole so broad that it would
virtually swallow the preemption clause itself."270 States could effectively
make all errors in emails actionable, impeding "unique opportunities for the
development and growth of frictionless commerce."271 In light of the poli-
cies behind the Act, the Fourth Circuit concluded that defining "falsity" as
including bare errors was "not compatible with the structure of the CAN-
SPAM Act as a whole."272
IV. Is THE CAN-SPAM ACT A FALSE HOPE?
When the CAN-SPAM Act was first announced, it was likely that many
people hoped the days spent ("wasted") sorting through unsolicited commer-
cial emails would soon be over. After all, is that not what the "Controlling"
the Assault of "Non-Solicited" Pornography and "Marketing" Act was sup-
posed to do? While this optimism might have been carried by some, others
262. Omega World Travel, 469 F.3d at 354 (citing Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513
U.S. 561, 570 (1995)).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 354-55.
266. Id.; see also CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7701.
267. Omega World Travel, 469 F.3d at 355.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 355-56.
270. Id. at 355.
271. Id. (citing CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7701(a)(1)).
272. Id. at 356.
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quickly realized273 that in fact the CAN-SPAM Act would hav e other conse-
quences. Four issues arising from the text of the Act and subsequent deci-
sions by the courts support this view that the CAN-SPAM Act was nothing
but a false hope.
The first issue with the CAN-SPAM Act is the allowance of legitimate
commercial marketers to continue sending unwanted commercial emails as
long as they comply with the specified guidelines in the Act. How does this
help consumers whose inboxes are flooded with spam, or the networks
whose resources are strained by the large influx of spam emails? Remember
the problems associated with spam discussed earlier in the comment274 - an-
noyance, costs, etc. Those problems never indicated they were singularly
attributed to fraudulent spam and in no way occurred when originating from
legitimate sources; a distinction was not made. As defined in the beginning,
spam is "unsolicited email," meaning unwanted, not that it is wanted if it
comes from legitimate sources and meets detailed requirements. While it is
nice to have opt-out options available, consumers want to save time, not
spend extra time opting-out of all their sparn emails. Consumers want their
inboxes free of emails that they were not looking forward to, or did not re-
quest. Some business consumers might be too busy with higher corporate
priorities to deal with spare, or might lack sufficient resources to process it.
Congress even recognized that email has become extremely important and
relied on by millions of Americans for commercial purposes. 275 So why
would Congress allow commercial marketers to continue invading this vital
business communication tool? Why would Congress want to allow market-
ers to plague and interrupt an important, evolving area of commerce? It is
not as if commercial marketers don't have ample opportunities in other areas
to bombard us with advertisements during our personal time. Billboards,
signs on buses, banners on websites, and even the five commercial breaks
during our favorite one-hour television show276 provide plenty of opportuni-
ties for legitimate marketers to shower consumers with unwanted solicita-
tions. It is apparent that Congress made the choice to focus on email as a
marketing opportunity and assist in its development, instead of protecting
consumers from all "unwanted" solicitations. The statutory text of the CAN-
SPAM Act simply provides guidelines for legitimate marketers to effectively
create "legal" spam. A stricter law addressing consumers' concerns about
the receipt of "unsolicited" email could have prohibited all unsolicited email.
273. Spamhaus, United States set to Legalize Spamming on January 1, 2004, Nov.
22, 2003, http://www.spamhaus.org/news.lasso?article=150 (last visited Dec. 1,
2007).
274. See supra Part I.C.
275. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7701(a)(1)(LexisNexis 2007).
276. Joe Mandese, TNS Finds Nets Begin 'Tinkering' With Commercial Breaks,
Mar. 1, 2007, http://publications.mediapost.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=Arti-
cles.showArticleHomePage&art_aid=56347 (last visited Dec. 1, 2007).
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A stricter law would not place responsibility on the consumer to actively
participate in an opt-out program to force the cessation of unsolicited email.
In the end, while consumers were optimistic Congress would fight spam in
an attempt to protect consumers and vital resources, Congress simply legal-
ized spam in an attempt to protect the unique opportunity in the "develop-
ment and growth of frictionless commerce."277
A second issue with the CAN-SPAM Act is that it unproductively fo-
cuses on illegitimate marketers responsible for sending fraudulent emails.
Section 7704 strives to prohibit a false or misleading transmission of infor-
mation, prohibit deceptive subject lines, including return email addresses-
all techniques employed by malicious spammers. In essence, this legislation
is aimed at those spammers who have been content obtaining email addresses
and menacing consumers with their deceptive emails in the face of applicable
FTC laws.278 But did Congress really believe that focusing on those commit-
ted to deceiving consumers through fraudulent emails would suddenly force
them to conform to societal rules? Some could point out Congress' inclusion
of Section 7705 as being productive. It could be seen as an attempt to hold
businesses accountable for employing spammers who promote their business
through spam emails. But the Act requires a standard of knowing or should
have known in the ordinary course of business, both of which create
problems. First, if the business knows that the person they are utilizing is
promoting the business through fraudulent or deceptive means, are they not
in the same category as the spammers who are unlikely to be deterred by new
legislation? Isn't it more likely that these shady businesses will increase
their efforts to help spammers remain untraceable as opposed to suddenly
promoting their business in legitimate ways? Second, how do you define
"ordinary course of business" in relation to email when it is an emerging and
developing marketing tool? Do the businesses need to be aware of the de-
ception before the emails are sent, or do they meet the "should have known"
standard only after consumers complain to them directly about being
deceived? Also, who should define this-judges, the technology industry,
both? Finally, some could argue that the CAN-SPAM Act's classification of
spamming techniques as aggravating279 and the ability of the FTC to specify
additional activities as aggravating280 is productive in the fight against mali-
cious spammers. Even if the CAN-SPAM Act was productive in fighting
malicious spam, this section is simply reactive, rather than proactive toward
spammers. New techniques, such as botnets, are constantly being discovered
and used by malicious spammers. 281 The FTC would be reacting to the old
techniques, while spammers were moving on to their new inventive methods
277. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7701(a)(1).
278. See FTC Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 45 (LexisNexis 2007).
279. CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7704(b).
280. Id. § 7704(c)(2).
281. See MessageLabs, supra note 3.
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of gathering emails and deceiving consumers.282 Legislation would become a
patchwork exercise as the FTC would just continue adding on techniques to
be classified as aggravating violations. Ask Microsoft Windows users or
other software consumers how they appreciate patches as solutions to
problems created by spiteful technological exploiters. While the CAN-
SPAM Act's attention on dishonest marketers supplies consumers with the
anticipatory hope that they will no longer be subjected to malicious emails,
the circumstances suggest that it is ultimately a futile endeavor.
Both of the aforementioned issues lead directly to the third issue with
the CAN-SPAM Act-Congress has simply shifted the burden of protecting
consumers from sparn to providers of internet access or email. As discussed
above, Congress allows legitimate marketers to send spam (assuming it
meets the requirements), while hopelessly attempting to control illegal spain;
consumers despise both forms of spain. Congress has essentially appropri-
ated the responsibility to internet access and email providers to discover and
implement technological solutions that eliminate all "unsolicited" commer-
cial email. The problems associated with spain will only be avoided if "all"
of the unsolicited commercial email is eliminated. The current approach to
accomplish this is not relying on and enforcing the CAN-SPAM Act, but
through the evolution of filtering technology created and paid for by those
affected most-internet access or email providers.283 When a consumer gets
inundated with spain, even if all are legal commercial emails, they will not
stop to think to blame Congress for their inadequate legislation. Instead, they
will look to the top of the webpage and identify the name of their email or
internet service provider. This is most evident in the White Buffalo case,
where it was agreed that White Buffalo legally obtained addresses and sent
legal commercial spam to thousands of members of the University of Texas
community.284 However, those members complained to the University of
Texas, who was forced for consumer satisfaction purposes to institute a filter
blocking all of White Buffalo's emails.285 Consumer satisfaction was
achieved as a result of the University using resources to implement a filter
technology adequate enough to block all of White Buffalo's emails, not as a
result of the enforcement of the CAN-SPAM Act. In fact, it was the Fifth
Circuit's interpretation of the preemption clause of the CAN-SPAM Act as
applied to internet providing state actors that allowed the University to regu-
282. While we continue to search for solutions addressing the spain problem in rela-
tion to email, spammers are quickly moving to exploit new areas, such as cell
phones. See CNNMoney.com, Get outta my phone!, Feb. 9, 2007, http://
money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2007/02/19/8400173/index
.htm?postversion=2007020906 (last visited Dec. 1, 2007). Even though the
CAN-SPAM Act addresses this issue in Section 7712, this is another example
of the reluctant search for new methods to deceive consumers by spammers.
283. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 22.
284. White Buffalo Ventures, 420 F.3d at 369 n.5.
285. Id. at 369-70.
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late its email system. Otherwise, had the CAN-SPAM Act preempted the
University of Texas's regulations, White Buffalo's emails would have had to
be received, forcing complaining members to go through the hassle of opt-
ing-out. The decision in effect encourages state actors to use resources to
provide email accounts and email access in order to be exempt from preemp-
tion; only then will state actors be able to implement their own regulations to
satisfy their consumers. What kind of legislation encourages the investment
into resources in order to be exempt from the legislation in order to provide
total consumer satisfaction? The CAN-SPAM Act and the interpretation of
the preemption clause in White Buffalo signify Congress's failure to actively
solve consumer concerns about spam and their willingness to burden others
with the responsibility.
A final issue with the CAN-SPAM Act is apparent in the preemption
doctrine's text and in Omega World Travel-states are unable to protect their
citizens from spam. Instead, they are forced to rely on an inadequate federal
statute. The preemption doctrine was included in the Act in order to super-
sede differing state and local statutes and create a national standard to govern
commercial emails.286 While I agree that creating a national standard for
fighting spai is the correct move, it must be a strict standard providing con-
sumers the protection that they seek. The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of
the preemption clause in Omega World Travel highlights the conclusion that
the CAN-SPAM Act is a weak national standard. The decision in Omega
World Travel is not at issue, as I believe it was rightly decided within the
terms of the CAN-SPAM Act.287 If the CAN-SPAM Act supported a "bare-
error reading of falsity," the exception to the preemption provision would
categorically be turned into a loophole "so broad that it would virtually swal-
low the preemption clause itself."288 Because the Oklahoma statutes are pre-
empted insofar as they apply to immaterial misrepresentations,289 the
problem arises in the fact that Mummagraphics was forced to rely on the
national standard encompassed in the CAN-SPAM Act. While the receipt of
numerous unsolicited "E-deals" is a good example of the problem consumers
face and want eliminated, under the national standard, Mummagraphics was
left powerless against this form of legal spam. 290 The inability of a national
286. CAN-SPAM ACT OF 2003: REPORT OF THE COMMiTrEE ON COMMERCE, ScI-
ENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, S. REP. No. 108-102, at 21 (2003), available at
http://www.spamlaws.com/pdf/report108-102.pdf.
287. I specify "within the terms of the CAN-SPAM Act" because I disagree with
Congress' desire to protect law-abiding senders of unsolicited commercial
spam. I would opt for legislation that prohibited all forms of unsolicited com-
mercial email; but I agree with the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the text of
the preemption clause as it is.
288. Omega World Travel, 469 F.3d at 355.
289. Id. at 351-356.
290. Id. at 357-58.
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standard to provide protection under those circumstances to a consumer such
as Mummagraphics indicates its futility. While the CAN-SPAM Act is be-
lieved to be a consumer-friendly statute, it instead cuts the knees off of states
in their attempt to protect their citizens as consumers, and forces consumers
to rely on a national standard that provides less protection.291 In fact, a na-
tional standard exists that legalizes spam.
In the end, the CAN-SPAM Act simply created a false hope. While it
seemed that Congress was proactively attempting to protect the consumer
from unwanted commercial solicitations, they instead invite spam by legaliz-
ing it, fruitlessly fight fraudulent spain from illegitimate spammers, shift the
burden and costs of meeting consumers' expectations (those that were sup-
posed to be met by the CAN-SPAM Act), and usurp states in their attempt to
protect their citizens as consumers.
V. CONCLUSION
It has been three years since the CAN-SPAM Act went into effect.
Since that time, the war on spam has continued to escalate as spammers pro-
duce inventive new methods to skirt the law and technology, while email
providers scramble to update filtering technologies to successfully eliminate
spam. It is unclear if there will ever be a complete solution; it is unques-
tioned that corrupt individuals determined to overcome obstacles and defy
laws in order to maliciously trick people will always exist. Maybe the solu-
tion lies in the form of stricter legislation; maybe the answer lies in the form
of advanced technology and software processes; or maybe a combination of
both is required. Maybe the problem needs to be addressed by privacy laws,
in terms of the right to be left alone, or some other form of tort laws. Re-
gardless, the first question that must be answered is whether we should treat
email as a private personal item or as a commercial advertising medium.
Only after that decision is made can we begin moving toward a unified stan-
dard in how to treat spam-a standard that can be trusted by consumers and
correctly defines their expectations. The first attempt by Congress with the
CAN-SPAM Act failed miserably at this. The CAN-SPAM Act appeared to
promise a lot, but ultimately delivered nothing . . . except more spam.
291. See Spanhaus, supra note 273.
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